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This mini-review presents extensions of the voter model that incorporate various plausible features
of real decision-making processes by individuals. Although these generalizations are not calibrated
by empirical data, the resulting dynamics are suggestive of realistic collective social behaviors.
I. INTRODUCTION
The voter model (VM) is an idealized description for
the evolution of opinions in a population. Each indi-
vidual (voter) can assume one of two states (e.g., 1/0,
↑ / ↓, Democrat/Republican), and a single voter resides
at each node of an arbitrary network. A voter is selected
at random and adopts the state of a randomly chosen
neighboring voter. Each individual is influenced only by
a fixed set of neighbors; there is no notion of a “right” or
a “wrong” opinion, there are no external influences (e.g.,
news media), or other types of interactions. The basic
update step is repeated at unit rate until a population of
N agents necessarily reaches consensus; this inevitability
of consensus is one of the basic features of the VM.
The simplicity and utility of the VM has sparked
much research in probability theory [1–4] and statisti-
cal physics [5–10] to understand its dynamical behavior.
One of the appeals of the VM is that it is exactly soluble
when voters are situated on regular lattices or homoge-
neous graphs. However, it is hard to envision that a
large group of individuals can come to consensus on any-
thing. This dichotomy between eventual consensus in the
VM and the common experience of opinion diversity has
motivated generalizations of the VM to include realistic
aspects of opinion formation that can forestall consensus.
Examples include individual stubbornness, partisanship,
truth versus falsehood, individual heterogeneity, social
heterogeneity, and multiple opinion states.
Some of these extensions of the VM are reviewed in
this article; a recent review that has some overlap with
the topics discussed here is Ref. [11]. Unless stated oth-
erwise, the underlying social network is a complete graph
of N nodes. While obviously unrealistic, this geometry-
free setting gives rise to much interesting phenomenology.
Additionally, real social networks are long ranged [12–14],
so the complete graph may be a better approximation
than a regular lattice of the underlying social substrate.
What is not treated here is the possibility of changes in
that social substrate at the same time that individual
opinions are changing. For a discussion of such adaptive
voter models see, e.g., Refs. [15–21].
The focus of this article is primarily on topics that have
been addressed by my collaborators and myself; space
limitations prevent a fuller discussion of many important
developments in this field. While the social attributes
mentioned above are inspired by reality, the resulting
models should still not be viewed as realistic. What is
missing is a calibration of the parameters of these more
general models with real social data [22]. In the absence
of such a connection, these extensions of the VM might
be viewed as instructive theoretical games. Neverthe-
less, they are phenomenologically rich and perhaps hint
at how to construct realistic opinion dynamics models.
II. CLASSIC VOTER MODEL
In the classic VM, N voters live at the nodes of an
arbitrary static graph, with one voter per node. The
opinion evolution is simplicity itself (Fig. 1):
1. Pick a voter uniformly at random.
2. This voter adopts the state of a random neighbor.
3. Repeat 1 & 2 until consensus is necessarily reached.
Figuratively, each agent has no self-confidence and
merely adopts the state of one of its neighbors. Two
basic observables of the VM are: (i) the exit probability
E(m) that N voters reach ↑ consensus as a function of the
initial magnetization m ≡ (N↑ − N↓)/N , where N↑ and
N↓ are the initial number of ↑ and ↓ voters, respectively,
and (ii) the consensus time T (m), the average time to
reach consensus as a function of m. For notational sim-
plicity, the N dependence is not written for E(m) and
T (m)
pick 1st pick 2nd
FIG. 1: Voter model update rule on a graph: a random voter
is picked and adopts the state of a random neighbor.
To mathematically express the update rule on a homo-
geneous graph, let σi = ±1 denote the voter state at site
i. It is easy to check that the rate wi at which this voter
state σi changes is given by
wi =
1
2
(
1− σi
z
∑
j
σj
)
, (1)
where z is the coordination number of each node and the
sum runs over the j nearest neighbors of site i. A crucial
feature of this transition rate is its linearity in the num-
ber of disagreeing neighbors. This linearity underlies the
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2solvability of the voter model. Another important con-
sequence of linearity is that there is no surface tension
along an interface that separates domains of ↑ and ↓ vot-
ers on finite-dimensional lattices. Here, surface tension
means that the interaction tends to make same-opinion
clusters compact and therefore hard to break. Thus the
voter model has a different character than the kinetic
Ising model with single spin-flip dynamics, in which in-
terface motion is driven by surface tension [7, 9, 23, 24].
Using (1) is immediate to verify that the average mag-
netization, m ≡ ∑i〈σi〉/N , is conserved. The time evo-
lution of the average of σi is given by
〈σ˙i〉 = −2〈σiwi〉 , (2a)
because whenever a voter flips, with rate wi, the change
in the value of the voter’s state is −2σi. Substituting the
flip rate (1) into the above equation gives
〈σ˙i〉 = −〈σi〉+ 1
z
∑
j
〈σj〉 , (2b)
where we use the fact that σ2i = 1. Summing (2b) over
all sites i gives magnetization conservation, m˙ = 0.
This conservation law immediately determines the exit
probability. When the initial magnetization equals m,
the average value of the final magnetization when con-
sensus is eventually reached equals
〈m∞〉 = 1× E(m) + (−1)×
(
1− E(m)) . (3)
That is, a final magnetization +1 is reached with proba-
bility E(m), while m∞ = −1 is reached with probability
1− E(m). Since 〈m∞〉 = m by magnetization conserva-
tion, we have E(m) = 12 (1 +m).
There is a systematic tool with many applications
to first-passage processes [25–27]—the backward Kol-
mogorov equation—that can be used to determine both
the exit probability and the consensus time in a simple
way. We will use this formalism throughout this arti-
cle. Suppose that the density of ↑ voters equals ρ. After
a single update, ρ may change to ρ ± δρ or remain the
same, with respective probabilities wρ→ρ±δρ and wρ→ρ,
after which the process restarts. Accordingly, the exit
probability obeys the backward Kolmogorov equation
E(ρ) = wρ→ρ+δρE(ρ+ δρ)
+ wρ→ρ−δρE(ρ− δρ) + wρ→ρE(ρ) , (4a)
subject to the boundary conditions E(0) = 0, E(1) = 1.
For the VM, the flipping probabilities are wρ→ρ±δρ =
ρ(1−ρ) and wρ→ρ = 1−2ρ(1−ρ). Taking the continuum
limit gives d2E/dρ2 = 0, with solution E(ρ) = ρ, or
equivalently, E(m) = 12 (1 + m). It is purely a matter
of convenience whether to use m or ρ as the dependent
variable.
We obtain the time to reach either ↑ or ↓ consensus by
the direct analog of Eq. (4a):
T (ρ) = wρ→ρ+δρ
[
T (ρ+δρ) + δt
]
+ wρ→ρ−δρ
[
T (ρ−δρ) + δt]+ wρ→ρ[T (ρ) + δt] .
(4b)
That is, the consensus time from an initial state with
density of ↑ voters equal to ρ is the probability for an
update to a new state where one voter has changed its
opinion, multiplied by the time to reach consensus from
this new state plus the time δt = 1/N for a single update.
The continuum limit now gives Nρ(1−ρ)d2 T/dρ2 = −1,
subject to the boundary conditions T (0)=T (1)=0. The
solution is
T (ρ) = −N[(1− ρ) ln(1− ρ) + ρ ln ρ] . (5)
This linear N dependence also represents the generic be-
havior for the consensus time of the VM on Euclidean lat-
tices in spatial dimensions d ≥ 3. For d = 2, T ∼ N lnN ,
while for d = 1, T ∼ N2 [1–5].
III. STUBBORN/CONFIDENT VOTERS
A. Individual Heterogeneity
While each individual in the VM has no self confidence,
real people do have some of this attribute, and it is natu-
ral to examine its role on VM dynamics. Self confidence
can be viewed as quantifying the relative weights of in-
dividual versus social information. Other factors that
influence the weights of these two information sources in-
clude: lower cost of individual versus social information,
prestige or authority of an acquaintance, propensity for
conformity, perceived differences in accuracy of individ-
ual versus social information, etc. Many of these issues
have been explored in the social science literature (see,
e.g., [28, 29]).
Perhaps the simplest way to implement self confidence
is to endow each voter i with its own intrinsic flip rate
ri [30]. That is, when a voter consults a neighbor with
a different opinion, the voter changes state with rate ri
instead of with rate 1. Such a diversity of individual
thresholds to a stimulus has been found to play an impor-
tant role in controlling collective social behaviors [31–33].
The transition rate of voter i with intrinsic flip rate ri in
this heterogeneous voter model (HVM) now is (compare
with Eq. (1))
wi =
1
2
(
1− riσi
z
∑
j
σj
)
, (6)
Following the same steps as in Eq. (2), we may verify
that it is not the magnetization, but rather the inverse
rate-weighted magnetization, ω ≡ 〈σi/ri〉, which is con-
served. As a consequence, the probability for a popu-
lation with initial value ω to reach ↑ consensus equals
ω. Thus a small fraction of ↑ voters with very small flip
rates—stubborn voters—leads to a probability of reach-
ing ↑ consensus that can be arbitrarily close to 1, even if
most of the population is initially in the ↓ state.
One can infer the average consensus time T for N het-
erogeneous voters on the complete graph by the follow-
ing simple argument. For specificity, suppose that the
3flip rate distribution is p(r) = Ar−α, with r ∈ (0, rmax]
and α ∈ [0, 1) so that p(r) is normalizable. To com-
pare across different α values, we fix the average flip
rate of the population to be 1. These conditions give
rmax = (2− α)/(1− α) and A = (2− α)rα−2max .
A voter with flip rate r needs to attempt of the order
of 1r flips before it actually changes state. Consequently,
we can view the population as containing an effective
number of voters N/r. Since the consensus time of the
VM is proportional to N , we anticipate that the con-
sensus time in the HVM should be proportional to the
average value of N/r. Also, as will be shown in Eq. (16),
the consensus time of the voter model on a general com-
plex graph is proportional to the effective population size.
With this hypothesis, the consensus time in the HVM is
T ∼ N〈1/r〉. To determine 〈1/r〉 for the flip-rate dis-
tribution p(r) = Ar−α, we first use the fact that the
smallest rate rmin among a finite population of N voters
is non-zero and determined by the extremal criterion [34]∫ rmin
0
Ar−α dr = N−1 ,
i.e., one voter in a population of N has a flip rate rmin
or smaller. This criterion gives rmin ∼ N−1/(1−α). Now
we estimate 〈1/r〉 as
〈1/r〉 =
∫ rmax
0
p(r)
r
dr ∼
∫ rmax
rmin
p(r)
r
dr ∼ Nα/(1−α) .
Finally,
T ∼ N1/(1−α) , (7)
for 0 < α < 1, while T ∼ N lnN for α = 0. Thus hetero-
geneity in individual flip rates forestalls consensus, as the
the consensus time scales superlinearly with N . Notice
that the inverse rate of the stubbornest voters is the same
order as the consensus time, so it is these stubbornest
voters that control the approach to consensus. The phe-
nomenon that a small fraction of stubborn individual can
overcome the majority opinion has been studied both in
the social science [35, 36] and physics literatures [37, 38],
and begins to address the basic question of how can a
small minority opinion group can eventually supplant a
majority opinion.
B. Confident Voting
The lack of individual voter confidence is one of many
unrealistic aspects of the VM. There are a variety of
socially/cognitively plausible mechanisms that people
might use to solve the dilemma of how much weight to
give to self knowledge compared to the knowledge of oth-
ers when deciding what to believe or what to do. One
such mechanism is reinforcement; in the context of the
voter model, a voter night typically require multiple en-
counters with neighbors that hold a different opinion be-
fore the voter actually changes opinion. This feature was
also highlighted in the social experiment of Centola [39],
where individual behavior changed only when a person
received multiple reinforcing inputs from others. Such
threshold behavior also arises in the q-voter model [40]
and in contagion models [41].
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FIG. 2: Illustration of the (a) marginal, and (b) extremal con-
fident voter models. Dashed arrows indicate possible confi-
dence level changes, while solid arrows indicate possible opin-
ion change events.
We investigate the role of a threshold through the con-
fident voter model (CVM) [42], in which each voter has
two opinion states and two levels of commitment to an
opinion–confident and unsure. Upon interacting with an
agent of a different opinion, a confident voter becomes un-
sure but keeps its opinion, while an unsure agent changes
opinion. That is, a confident voter requires two con-
secutive prompts before changing opinion in the CVM
(Fig. 2).
The basic variables are the opinion of each voter and
its confidence level. We label the states of an agent as Pc
and Pu for confident and unsure ↑ agents, respectively,
and correspondingly Mc and Mu for ↓ agents. There are
two natural variants of confident voting:
• Marginal: An unsure agent that changes opinion is
also unsure about the new opinion state and can
switch back in a single update.
• Extremal: An unsure agent “sees the light” after an
opinion change and becomes confident of its opin-
ion. This voter again requires two interactions with
an opposite-opinion voter to switch another time.
With the assumption that the rates of all processes
sketched in Fig. 2 equal 1, it is simple exercise to write
the rate equations for the densities of voters in each state.
For the marginal version, these equations are:
Marginal:
P˙c = −(Mc +Mu)Pc + PcPu ,
P˙u = MPc − PcPu + (MuPc −McPu) ,
(8a)
with parallel equations for Mc and Mu by interchanging
M ↔ P . For the extremal version, the rate equations
are (and similarly for Mc and Mu)
Extremal:
P˙c = −McPc +MuPu + PcPu ,
P˙u = McPc −MuPu − PcPu + (MuPc−McPu) .
(8b)
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FIG. 3: Evolution of the densities for the marginal (left) and
extremal (right) models with the near-symmetric initial con-
dition Pc = 0.50001, Mc = 0.49999, and Pu = Mu = 0.
Solving these equations [42] gives the following basic
results: For a symmetric population with equal densities
of ↑ and ↓ voters, the final densities are Pc = Mc = 0
and Pu = Mu = 1 for the marginal model and Pc =
Mc =
1
2 − Pu = 12 −Mu = 14 (
√
5 + 1) for the extremal
model. It is intriguing that for the extremal version of
the CVM, a symmetric population does not reach con-
sensus. However, for a slight asymmetry in the initial
conditions, consensus is reached after a time scale that is
of the order of lnN . Intriguingly, the relaxation to con-
sensus is governed by two widely separated time scales
(Fig. 3). We will encounter another example of this in-
triguing multiple time-scale relaxation in a 3-state voter
model with constrained voting rules in Sec. VI A.
IV. HETEROGENEOUS NETWORKS
A fruitful extension of the voter model is to networks
with broad distributions of degrees [43–49]; the degree
of a node is the number of incident links on this node.
Here, the magnetization is no longer conserved and the
route to consensus is dramatically different than for the
VM on degree-regular networks.
a nodes
b nodes
degree a
degree b
FIG. 4: The complete bipartite graph Ka,b.
A useful way to begin to understand the role of degree
heterogeneity on VM dynamics is to study the simplest
graph with different degrees, namely, the complete bi-
partite graph Ka,b [46]. This graph consists of two sub-
groups, in which each member of subgroup a is connected
to every member of subgroup b and vice versa. Thus Ka,b
consists of a nodes of degree b and b nodes of degree a
(Fig. 4). On this network, it is a simple exercise to solve
the VM dynamics. Let Na,b be the respective number
of ↑ voters on each subgraph. In an update event, these
numbers change according to
dNa =
a
a+ b
[a−Na
a
Nb
b
− Na
a
b−Nb
b
]
,
dNb =
b
a+ b
[b−Nb
b
Na
a
− Nb
b
a−Na
a
]
. (9)
The gain term in dNa accounts for flipping a ↓ voter in
subgraph a due to its interaction with a ↑ voter in b, while
the loss term accounts for flipping a ↑ voter in a. Since
the time increment for an event δt = 1/(a + b) = 1/N ,
the subgraph densities ρa = Na/a and ρb = Nb/b obey
ρ˙a,b = ρb,a − ρa,b, with solution
ρa,b(t) =
1
2 [ρa,b(0)−ρb,a(0)] e−2t + 12 [ρa(0)+ρb(0)].
(10)
Thus ρa + ρb is asymptotically conserved and ap-
proaches ρ∞ ≡ 12 [ρa(0) + ρb(0)], but the magnetization
m = (aρa + bρb)/(a + b) is not conserved [43]. Because
ρa + ρb is the conserved quantity, the sum of the sub-
graph densities in the final state equals 2 with probability
E(ρa, ρb), which is the exit probability to the state where
all voters are in the ↑ state. Conservation therefore gives
E(ρa, ρb) =
1
2 [ρa(0) + ρb(0)] . (11)
When the voters on the two subgraphs are initially op-
positely oriented, there is an equal probability of ending
with all ↑ voters or all ↓ voters, independent of the sub-
graph sizes. In the extreme case of the star graph Ka,1,
with a  1 voters with ↑ opinion at the periphery and
a single ↓ voter at the center, there is a 50% chance of ↓
consensus.
We follow the approach outlined in Sec. II to deter-
mine the consensus time T (ρa, ρb). This time satisfies
the backward Kolmogorov equation [25–27, 46],
T (ρa, ρb)=w(ρa, ρb → ρa± 1a , ρb)[T (ρa± 1a , ρb) + δt]
+w(ρa, ρb → ρa, ρb± 1b )[T (ρa, ρb± 1b ) + δt]
+w(ρa, ρb → ρa, ρb)[T (ρa, ρb) + δt], (12)
which generalizes Eq. (4b) to the complete bipartite
graph. The first term (which is actually a shorthand
for the two contributions with a + sign and a − sign)
accounts for flipping a ↓ (↑) voter in subgraph a so that
ρa → ρa ± 1a . The probability for flipping a ↓ voter in
subgraph a is w(ρa, ρb → ρa + 1a , ρb) = aa+b (1 − ρa)ρb,
where aa+b (1− ρa) is the probability to choose a ↓ voter
in subgraph a. Similar explanations apply for the other
terms in Eq. (12). This equation is subject to the bound-
ary conditions T (0, 0) = T (1, 1) = 0.
Expanding this recursion to second order, gives, after
straightforward algebra,
Nδt = (ρa − ρb)(∂a − ∂b)T (ρa, ρb) (13)
− 12 (ρa + ρb − 2ρaρb)
(
1
a ∂
2
a +
1
b ∂
2
b
)
T (ρa, ρb)
where ∂i denotes partial derivative with respect to ρi.
The first term on the right corresponds to a convection
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FIG. 5: Trajectories of ρ6(t) (degree less than µ1 = 8) and
ρ11(t) (degree greater than µ1) versus ω, for one realization
of the voter model on a configuration model network of 2 ×
105 nodes, with degree distribution nk ∼ k−2.5, and average
degree µ1 = 8. The initial state is (ρk>µ1 , ρk≤µ1) = (0, 1).
The dotted curves show the initial transient for t . 1, after
which diffusive motion leads to consensus at (1, 1).
that drives the population to equal subgraph magnetiza-
tions in a time scale of order one, while the second term
corresponds to the subsequent diffusive fluctuations that
govern the ultimate approach to consensus (Fig. 5). We
thus determine the consensus time by replacing the sub-
graph densities ρa and ρb by their common value ρ. Do-
ing so ignores early-time transients when the subgraph
densities are unequal. We also transform the derivatives
with respect to ρa and ρb in Eq. (13) to derivative with
respect to ρ to yield
1
4 ρ(1− ρ)
(
1
a +
1
b
)
∂2T = −1 , (14a)
with solution
TN (ρ) = − 4ab
a+ b
[(1−ρ) ln(1−ρ) + ρ ln ρ ] . (14b)
Notice the close correspondence between the results given
in Eqs. (14) with Eq. (5) and its defining differential equa-
tion. For a = O(1) and b = O(N) (star graph), the con-
sensus time TN ∼ O(1), while if both a and b are O(N),
then TN ∼ O(N), as on a complete graph.
This approach can be extended in a natural way to
networks with an arbitrary distribution of degrees. If we
neglect correlations between the degrees of neighboring
nodes, then Eq. (12) readily generalizes from two densi-
ties on nodes of degrees a and b to an unlimited number
of densities ρk on the set of nodes of any degree k. Now
taking the continuum limit of this equation and mak-
ing use of the conservation law that the degree-weighted
density of ↑ voters [46]
ω ≡
∑
k
knkρk/
∑
k
knk
is conserved, we eventually arrive at the counterpart of
Eq. (14a), namely,
1
Nµ21
∑
k
k2nk ω(1− ω) ∂2ωT = −1 , (15)
with µm =
∑
k k
mnk the m
th moment of the degree dis-
tribution. The solution for the consensus time is (com-
pare again with Eq. (5))
T (ω) = −N µ
2
1
µ2
[(1− ω) ln(1− ω) + ω lnω ]
≡ Neff [(1− ω) ln(1− ω) + ω lnω , (16)
With Neff the effective population size.
For a scale-free network whose degree distribution is
given by nk ∼ k−ν , the mth moment of this distribution
is given by
µm ∼
∫ kmax
kmnk dk .
Here kmax ∼ N1/(ν−1) is the maximal degree in a finite
network of N nodes, which obtained from the extremal
condition
∫
kmax
k−ν dk = N−1 [34]. Notice that the sec-
ond moment diverges at the upper limit for ν ≤ 3 while
the first moment diverges for ν ≤ 2. Assembling these
results for the moments, the mean consensus time on a
scale-free graph has the N dependence
TN ∼

N ν > 3,
N/ lnN ν = 3,
N (2ν−4)/(ν−1) 2 < ν < 3,
(lnN)2 ν = 2,
O(1) ν < 2.
(17)
The primary result is that consensus is achieved quickly
on networks with broad degree distributions. This rapid
consensus is facilitated by “hubs”—nodes of the largest
degrees that influence their very many neighbors. More-
over, there is a two time-scale route to consensus, with a
rapid approach to a state where the densities of ↑ voters
on nodes of any degree reach a common value (Fig. 5),
after which diffusive fluctuations drive the approach to
consensus.
V. NON-CONSERVED DYNAMICS
A. Majority Rule
While the VM update rule is simple and natural, there
are other plausible ways in which a group of voters might
change opinions. A basic example is majority rule, for
which there exists a vast social science literature (see
e.g., [50–53]). From the mathematical perspective, there
are two natural implementations of majority rule. One
is that a voter adopts the state of the majority in its
6local neighborhood. This is just the update rule of the
kinetic Ising model with single spin-flip dynamics at zero
temperature [23, 24]. This well-studied dynamics leads
to a coarsening mosaic of ↑ and ↓ domains that usually,
but not always (see e.g., [54, 55]), ends in consensus.
Alternatively, a group of voters is selected and all vot-
ers in this group adopt the local majority opinion. Re-
lated models have been studied in various contexts [56–
59]. Here we treat the situation where each voter has two
opinion states and the group size equals three—the small-
est possible size of a group with an odd number of neigh-
bors. In an update, a group of three voters is selected
at random from a total population of N , corresponding
to the complete-graph or mean-field limit. These voters
all adopt the group majority opinion and return to the
general population [60]. This update is repeated until a
finite population necessarily reaches consensus.
Let us first determine En, the exit probability that the
population ends with all ↑ voters when starting with n ↑
voters. To compute En, note first that the quantity(
3
j
)(
N − 3
n− j
)/(N
n
)
is probability that a randomly chosen group of three vot-
ers has j voters of ↑ opinion and 3−j voters of ↓ opinion
when an N -voter population contains n ↑ voters. This
group becomes all ↑ for j = 2, becomes all ↓ for j = 1,
while for j = 0 or 3 there is no evolution. Thus En obeys
the backward Kolmogorov equation
En =
{
3
(
N−3
n−2
)
En+1+3
(
N−3
n−1
)
En−1
+
[(
N−3
n−3
)
+
(
N−3
n
)]
En
}/(
N
n
)
, (18a)
or
(n− 1)(En+1 − En) = (N − n− 1)(En − En−1). (18b)
This second-order recursion can be solved by standard
methods [61], and the final result is
En =
n−1∑
j=1
Γ(N − 2)
Γ(j) Γ(N − j − 1) , (19a)
where Γ(·) is the Euler gamma function. Correspond-
ingly, the probability to end with all ↓ voters is EN−n.
In the continuum limit, this result for En simplifies to
En −→ E(y) ' 12
[
1 + erf(y/
√
2)
]
, (19b)
with y = (2n − N)/√N . The curve of E(y) versus y
is a sigmoidal function that steepens as N increases and
becomes a step function in the N →∞ limit. It becomes
extremely unlikely that the initial minority wins in a large
finite population.
Following the same reasoning as above, we also com-
pute the consensus time, T (n), when starting with n ↑
voters. This quantity obeys the recursion
Tn=
{
3
(
N−3
n−2
)
(Tn+1+δT )+3
(
N−3
n−1
)
(Tn−1+δT )
+
[(
N−3
n−3
)
+
(
N−3
n
)]
(Tn+δT )
}/(
N
n
)
, (20)
subject to the boundary conditions T (0) = T (N) = 0.
The natural choice for the time increment of an elemental
update is δT = 3/N , so that each spin is updated once
per unit time, on average. This inhomogeneous second-
order recursion can again be solved by standard methods
and the final result is (Fig. 6)
Tn = 1 + 2k(2k − 1)
n−1∑
j=1
Vj
Γ(j) Γ(2k − j) (21)
with Vj =
k−j∑
i=1
Γ(k − i) Γ(k + i− 1)
(k − i+ 1) (k + i) ,
where k = 12 (N−1). While the exact expression is un-
wieldy, the N →∞ behavior of Tn is simple:
T (n) '
{
2 lnN n = N/2 ,
lnN n 6= N/2 . (22)
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FIG. 6: Consensus time Tn versus p = n/N for N = 81, 401,
2001, 10001, and 50001 (more step-like curves for larger N).
On finite-dimensional lattices, surprisingly rich behav-
ior arises that is distinct from both the VM and the zero-
temperature kinetic Ising model. In one dimension, a
natural update rule is: select a group of three contigu-
ous spins that all adopt the majority opinion and re-
peat this step until consensus is reached. At long times,
this rule leads to Ising-like dynamics in which the den-
sity of domain walls—the boundary between neighboring
opposite-opinion voters—decays with time as t−1/2.
7On hypercubic d-dimensional lattices, a natural group
definition is the von Neumann neighborhood—a voter
and its 2d nearest neighbors. In an update, voters in
a randomly selected neighborhood all adopt the major-
ity opinion, and this update is repeated until consen-
sus is reached. This leads to a dynamics that resembles
the kinetic Ising model in that domain interfaces have
non-zero surface tension. However, straight interfaces,
which are stable in the kinetic Ising model and prevent
the ground state from being reached, are unstable in ma-
jority rule. Thus consensus is always achieved in major-
ity rule. Simulations indicate that the consensus time
grows as Nν , with the exponent ν continuously decreas-
ing in the spatial dimension, with numerical values 2,
1.24, 0.72, and 0.56 for spatial dimension d = 1, 2, 3, and
4, respectively [62]. There is currently no analytical un-
derstanding of this unusual dimension dependence of the
consensus time.
B. Nonlinear update rules
There are many socially plausible update rules in which
the flip rate of a voter depends nonlinearly on the fraction
of disagreeing neighbors. We discuss two such examples:
(i) the vacillating voter model (VVM) [63] and (ii) the
non-conserved voter model (NVM) [64, 65].
In a VVM update, a voter consults two of its neigh-
bors and changes opinion if it disagrees with either of
them. This irresolution causes a global bias toward zero
magnetization. Concretely, the VVM update rules are:
1. A random voter i picks a random neighbor j. If j
disagrees with i, then i changes state.
2. If j and i agree, then i picks another random neigh-
bor k and adopts its state.
3. Repeat steps 1–2 until consensus is reached.
It is easily checked that the flip probability for a vacil-
lating voter on the square lattice equals 0, 12 ,
5
6 , and 1,
respectively, when the number of misaligned neighbors
is 0, 1, 2, and ≥ 3. In contrast, for the VM, the flip
probability is k4 , where k is the number of disagreeing
neighbors.
In the mean-field limit, the density x of ↑ voters evolves
by the rate equation
x˙ = −x [1− x2]+ (1− x) [1− (1− x)2]
= x(1− x)(1− 2x) . (23)
The first term on the right accounts for the loss of ↑
voters in which a ↑ voter is first picked (the factor x),
and then the neighborhood cannot consist of two ↑ voters
(the factor 1− x2). Similarly, in the second (gain) term,
a ↓ voter is first picked, and then the neighborhood must
contain at least one ↑ voter. From this rate equation,
there are unstable fixed points at x = 0, 1 and a stable
fixed point at x = 1/2. Thus the population is driven to
the zero-magnetization state.
Because consensus is the only absorbing state of
the stochastic dynamics, a finite population ultimately
reaches this state. To characterize the approach to con-
sensus, we determine the exit probability E(n), the prob-
ability that a population with n ↑ voters of out N vot-
ers reaches ↑ consensus. This exit probability obeys a
backward equation of the form given in Eq. (4a), with
transition probabilities that are, in the continuum limit,
wn→n+1 = (1−x)
[
1− (1−x)2]
wn→n−1 = x(1−x2)
wn→n = x3 + (1−x)3 .
Substituting these probabilities in the backward equation
and taking the continuum limit, gives
3x(1− x)
2N
∂2E
∂x2
+ x(1− x)(1− 2x)∂E
∂x
= 0, (24)
with solution
E(x) =
∫ x−1/2
−1/2
e2Ny
2/3 dy
/∫ 1/2
−1/2
e2Ny
2/3 dy. (25)
The exit probability approaches an anti-sigmoidal shape
in which E(x) attains the nearly constant value 1/2 over a
progressively wider range for increasing N (Fig. 7). This
behavior reflects the voting bias towards zero magnetiza-
tion. Thus a population with an arbitrary initial magne-
tization is driven to an effective potential well at x = 12
(equivalently at m = 0), and consensus is achieved by
the population surmounting this effective potential bar-
rier. As a result, the exit probability becomes nearly
independent of x for large N .
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FIG. 7: Exit probability E(x) versus the density of ↑ voters
x for the cases N = 8, 32, and 128.
In the same spirit, the consensus time obeys (24) but
with the right-hand side now equal to −1. The formal
solution is elementary but ugly, and is not expressible in
closed form. The main result, however, is that the con-
sensus time scales exponentially in N . Again, in contrast
to the VM, the global bias drives the population into an
8effective potential well that must be surmounted to reach
consensus, leading to a large consensus time.
In the NVM, the flip rate of a voter explicitly depends
nonlinearly on the fraction of disagreeing neighbors. We
treat the simplest setting of one dimension. Let rf denote
the flip rate of a voter when the fraction of disagreeing
neighbors is f (Fig. 8). It is natural to impose r0 = 0, so
that no evolution occurs when there is local consensus.
Then the most general description involves two param-
eters, r1 and r2. By absorbing one rate into the overall
time scale, the only parameter is the ratio γ = r2/r1.
For γ > 2, the influence of two neighbors is more than
twice that of one neighbor. For γ →∞, a voter changes
opinion by “unanimity rule”—all neighbors must have
the opposite opinion [66]. The case γ = 2 corresponds
to the classical voter model. For γ < 2, one disagreeing
neighbor is more effective in triggering an opinion change
than in the classical voter model, and the limiting case
γ = 1 corresponds to the vacillating voter model (VVM).
+
+ + + + + +++
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FIG. 8: Update events in the non-conserved voter model in
one dimension. A voter changes state with rate r1 if it has
1 disagreeing neighbor (left), and with rate r2 if it has 2 dis-
agreeing neighbors (right).
It is a pleasant game to work out the NVM flip rate in
one dimension. For a voter at site i, this rate is
wi=γ+2− γσi(σi−1 + γσi+1) + (γ−2)σi−1σi+1 . (26)
Left/right symmetry mandates that the σiσi+1 and the
σiσi−1 terms have the same coefficient. For γ = 2, the
σi−1σi+1 term vanishes, and the VM equation of motion
is recovered. We shall see, however, that the σi−1σi+1
term couples the rate equation for the single-body quan-
tity σi to 3-body terms (see also Ref. [67]).
Because of this coupling, it is not possible to solve
the NVM model exactly. Nevertheless, we obtain an ap-
proximate solution by truncating the hierarchy of rate
equations for higher-order correlation functions. Using
(2), the time dependence of the mean opinion si ≡ 〈σi〉
is given by
s˙i = 2γ(si+1+si−1)− 2(γ+2)si − 2(γ−2)〈σi−1σiσi+1〉 .
(27)
For γ = 2, the nonlinear term vanishes and the resulting
diffusion-like equation is exactly soluble. However, for
γ 6= 2, the si is coupled to higher-order correlations.
Let us first neglect all correlations and assume that
〈σj−1σjσj+1〉 ≈ m3, with the magnetization m = 〈si〉.
With this assumption, Eq. (27) reduces to
m˙ = 2(γ − 2)(m−m3), (28)
so that the magnetization is not conserved for γ 6= 2. The
stable solutions of Eq. (28) are either consensus (m = ±1)
when γ > 2, or stasis, with equal densities of the two
types of voters (m = 0), when γ < 2.
A better assumption is to to truncate the hierarchy of
equations for multi-spin correlation functions at higher
order [63, 68]. Consider the rate equation for the nearest-
neighbor correlation function 〈σjσj+1〉:
∂〈σjσj+1〉
∂t
= −2(γ − 2) [〈σj−1σj〉+ 〈σj+1σj+2〉]
+ 2γ [〈σj−1σj+1〉+ 〈σjσj+2〉]
+ 4γ − 4(γ + 2)〈σjσj+1〉 . (29)
To close this equation, we need to approximate the
second-neighbor correlation functions 〈σjσj+2〉. To make
progress, let us first examine the role of domain walls—
nearest-neighbor anti-aligned voters—whose density is
ρ = (1 − 〈σiσi+1〉)/2, on the dynamics. According to
the transition rate (26), an isolated domain wall diffuses
freely for any γ. However, when two domain walls are ad-
jacent, they annihilate with probability Pa = γ/(2 + γ)
or they hop away from each other with probability Ph =
2/(2 + γ). Thus when γ > 2, Pa > Ph, and adjacent
domain walls tend to annihilate, while they repel when
γ < 2. The interaction of two domain walls is there-
fore equivalent to single-species annihilation, A+A→ 0,
but with a reaction rate that is modified compared to
freely diffusing particles because of this interaction. Nev-
ertheless, the domain wall density asymptotically de-
cays as t−1/2 for any γ < ∞, but with an interaction-
independent amplitude [71].
Since domain walls become widely separated at long
times, we therefore approximate the second-neighbor cor-
relation function as 〈σjσj+2〉 ≈ 〈σjσj+1〉 [63]. We also
write the nearest-neighbor correlation function 〈σjσj+1〉
for a spatially homogeneous population as m2 for no-
tational simplicity. Now the rate equation (29) for m2
becomes
m˙2 = 4γ − 4γm2 . (30)
For the uncorrelated initial condition, m2(0) = m(0)
2,
the solution is
m2(t) = 1 +
[
m(0)2 − 1] e−4γt , (31)
where m(0) ≡ 〈sj(0)〉 is the magnetization at t = 0.
In a similar spirit, we decouple the 3-spin correlation
function as 〈σj−1σjσj+1〉 ≈ mm2 [63] and average over
all sites to simplify the rate equation (27) for the mean
spin in a spatially homogeneous population to
m˙ = 2(2− γ)me−4γt[m(0)2 − 1] . (32)
Solving this equation and taking the t → ∞ limit, we
obtain a non-trivial relation between the final and initial
magnetizations:
m(∞) = m(0) e(2−γ)(m(0)2−1)/2γ . (33)
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FIG. 9: Exit probability E(x) for the non-conserved voter
model in one dimension from Eq. (34) as a function of the
initial density of ↑ voters x for different values of γ.
However, the average magnetization in a finite popu-
lation does not perpetually fluctuate around this asymp-
totic value but ultimately reaches ±1 because consensus
is the only absorbing state of the stochastic dynamics.
We characterize this consensus by the exit probability
E(x) to reach ↑ consensus when initially n = xN out of
N voters are in the ↑ state. Since the density of ↑ voters
x = (1+m)/2, and m(∞) = 2E(x)−1 (see (3)), Eq. (33)
gives (Fig. 9)
E(x) =
1
2
[
(2x− 1)e2x(2−γ)(x−1)/γ + 1
]
. (34)
The non-linear behavior of E(x) versus x given Fig. 9
arises generally in opinion evolution models where the av-
erage magnetization is not conserved, such as the major-
ity rule model of Sec. V A. These sigmoidal (initial slope
greater than 1) and anti-sigmoidal curves are generic be-
haviors for the exit probability. Because of the generality
of these two classes, they have been widely investigated
in the social science literature, where a variety of mech-
anisms have been proposed to generate these two basic
forms for the exit probability [69, 70].
VI. MORE THAN TWO STATES
A. Constrained 3-Choice Voting
There is nothing sacrosanct about two voting states.
A natural extension of the VM is to allow a voter to
have any number voting states. For k voting states and
a VM update rule (Sec. II), the resulting dynamics is
again VM like. If we label the states as {a, b, c, . . . , k}
and collectively denote the voter states {b, c, . . . , k} as a,
then the dynamics of a and a is just the usual 2-state
voter model, with the initial density of a equal to the
sum of the initial densities of {b, c, . . . , k}.
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FIG. 10: Update events for different pair states in constrained
3-choice voting.
More interesting behavior arises if the interactions be-
tween the states are not all identical. A simple extension
of this genre is the constrained 3-state voter model [72]
(Fig. 10), where we suggestively label the states as leftists
L (with density x), rightists R (density y), and centrists
C (density z = 1 − x − y). In an elemental interaction,
the pair LC equiprobably transforms to LL or CC, while
CR equiprobably transforms toRR or CC. That is, there
is usual voter model dynamics between a centrist and a
voter in any other opinion state. However leftists and
rightists are sufficiently separated in opinion space that
do not interact.
In this 3-choice model, updates between interacting
pairs occur repeatedly until the population can no longer
evolve. While the sense of the interactions are either
neutral or consensus promoting, the population can get
trapped in a frozen state that consists of only leftists
or consists of only rightists. This freezing, even though
the elemental update is consensus promoting, also oc-
curs in the venerable Axelrod model [73–75] that will be
discussed below.
We now outline how to determine the probability
F (x, y) that the population reaches a frozen state as a
function of the initial densities, x and y. This quantity
is just the first-passage probability for a trajectory to hit
the line x+y = 1 when it starts at some point within the
tetrahedral region x+y+z < 1 in the composition space
spanned by the densities x, y, and z (Fig. 11). We need
to impose the boundary conditions F = 0 for x = 0 and
y = 0, where the probability of reaching the frozen state
is zero, and F = 1 on the line segment x + y = 1. This
first-passage probability obeys the backward Kolmogorov
equation (see the discussion that explained Eq. (4a))
F (x, y) = px[F (x− δ, y) + F (x+ δ, y)]
+ py[F (x, y − δ) + F (x, y + δ)]
+ [1− 2(px + py)]F (x, y) ,
(35)
where
px = N−N0/[N(N − 1)]
py = N+N0/[N(N − 1)]
are the transition probabilities for (N−, N0) → (N− ±
1, N0∓1) and (N+, N0)→ (N+±1, N0∓1), respectively,
and δ = 1/N .
In the continuum limit, (35) reduces to
x
∂2F (x, y)
∂x2
+ y
∂2F (x, y)
∂y2
= 0 , (36)
subject to the mixed boundary conditions F (x, 0) =
F (0, y) = 0, F (x, 1 − x) = 1. This mixed boundary
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FIG. 11: The composition triangle x+ y+ z = 1. The purple
dots denote consensus states and the heavy blue line denotes
frozen final states where no centrists remain. Typical trajec-
tories are shown. When a trajectory reaches the lines x = 0 or
y = 0, the trajectory subsequently remains on this line until
consensus is necessarily reached.
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FIG. 12: The probabilities to reach the frozen state, F , and to
reach the centrist and extremist consensus states, C0 and C+,
respectively, as a function of the initial density of centrists z
for the case of equal initial densities of leftists and rightists,
y/x = 1.
condition is a complicating feature that seems to pre-
vent a direct solution. However, after a series of coor-
dinate transformations, Eq. (36) can be mapped onto a
Schro¨dinger equation in the presence of a specific po-
tential well, which is soluble [72]. By these means, the
solution to Eq. (36) is [72]
F (x, y) =
∑
n odd
2(2n+ 1)
n(n+ 1)
√
xy (x+y)n P 1n
(
x−y
x+y
)
, (37)
where P 1n is the associated Legendre function. By a sim-
ilarly tedious calculation, the probability to reach ↓ con-
sensus as a function of the initial densities x and y is
C−(x, y) = x−
∞∑
n=1
(2n+ 1)
n(n+ 1)
√
xy (x+y)n P 1n
(
x−y
x+y
)
(38)
The probability to reach ↑ consensus, C+(x, y), is ob-
tained by the obvious symmetry C+(x, y) = C−(y, x).
One of the main features of the final-state probabil-
ities in Fig. 12 is that centrists are needed to catalyze
consensus. As the centrist density z → 1, the probability
of reaching a frozen state goes to zero. Another comfort-
ing feature of this figure is that extremist consensus is
relatively unlikely to occur.
B. Axelrod Model
Some societies culturally fragment, even though indi-
viduals may try to reach agreement with acquaintances.
The Axelrod model provides a simple description for
this dichotomy [73–75]. Here, each individual possesses
F characteristic features—for example, preferences for
sports, for music, for food, etc—that each can assume q
distinct values. In an update, a pair of agents is selected
at random. If the agents disagree on all features, no inter-
action occurs. However, if the agents agree on at least one
feature, they interact with probability equal to the frac-
tion of shared features. In an interaction, a previously
unshared feature is selected at random and one agent
copies the preference for this feature from its interaction
partner. While the interaction ostensibly brings agents
closer together, the restriction that only sufficiently com-
patible individuals can interact prevents this convergence
from reaching consensus.
Depending on the parameters (F, q), the Axelrod
model on a finite-dimensional lattice undergoes a phase
transition between consensus and a frozen discordant
state, where each interacting pair is incompatible [73–
79]. In the mean-field limit, the corresponding transition
is between a steady state with perpetual social “churn”
and a frozen state. There is also a non-monotonic time
dependence of the societal activity level [76] that occurs
over a very long time scale [76, 80]. This long time scale is
unexpected because the underlying dynamical equations
(Eqs. (39) below) have rates of the order of one. Impor-
tant examples where dynamics with rates of the order
of 1 leads to anomalously long time scales include the
Lorenz model [81], the three-species competition species
models [82], and HIV [83]. In the Lorenz model, although
the dynamics is a contracting map, trajectories can fall
into a strange attractor with very long period dynamics.
In HIV, after an individual contracts the disease, there
is an immune response over several months, followed by
a latency period that can last beyond a decade, during
which an individual’s T-cell level slowly diminishes. Our
results for the Axelrod model provide some insight into
how widely separated time scales can arise in a simple
dynamical system.
To simplify the modeling as much as possible, we dis-
cuss a mean-field version in which each agent has a small
and fixed number z of interaction partners, correspond-
ing to a degree-regular random graph. We also restrict
to the simplest non-trivial case of F = 2 features. Thus
there are 3 types of links between individuals: links with
no shared features (type 0), and links with both features
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shared (type 2). These two types of links are inactive
because neither individual changes its state across such
links. Finally, there are links of type 1 where a single
feature is shared, which are the only active links in the
population.
By accounting for the various interaction events, the
time dependence of the fraction of links of type i (i =
0, 1, 2) when a single agent changes its state is described
by the rate equations [80]
P˙0 =
z − 1
z
P1
(
−λP0 + 1
2
P1
)
,
P˙1 =−P1
z
+
z − 1
z
P1
(
λP0 − 1+λ
2
P1 + P2
)
,
P˙2 =
P1
z
+
z − 1
z
P1
(
λ
2
P1 − P2
)
,
(39)
where z is the number of neighbors of each individ-
ual. The first term on the right-hand sides of the first
two equations account for the direct interaction between
agents i and j that changes a link of type 1 to type 2.
For example, in P˙1, a type-1 link and the shared fea-
ture across this link is chosen with probability P1/2 in
an update event. This update decrements the number of
type-1 links by one in a time dt = 1/N , where N is the
population size. Assembling these factors gives the term
−P1/z in this equation.
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FIG. 13: State-changing updates on link jk when agent j
changes state from a1b2 → a1b1 in an interaction with i. The
values at the right give the relative rates of each type of event.
The remaining terms in the rate equations represent
indirect interactions. For example, if agent j changes
state from (a1, b2) to (a1, b1) then the link jk that joins
to agent k in state (a1, b1) changes from type 1 to type 2
(Fig. 13). The probability for this event is proportional
to λP1/2: P1 is the probability that the indirect link is
of type 1, the factor 1/2 accounts for the fact that only
the first feature of agents j and k can be shared, while
λ is the conditional probability that i and k share one
feature that is simultaneously not shared with j.
If the distribution of preferences is uniform, then λ =
1/(q−1). While λ generally depends on the densities Pm,
the simulations presented in Ref. [80] indicate that λ is
roughly constant and close to 1/(q − 1). When we use
this assumption, the rate equations (39) become soluble.
The solution itself is too unwieldy to display here (the
full solution is given in Ref. [80]), but the main result is
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FIG. 14: Density of active links P1(t) for q = qc − 4−k, with
k = −1, 1, 3, 5, and 7 (progressively lower minima). Each
agent has z = 4 neighbors. The dashed curve shows how
P1 → 0 for q = qc + 4−6.
quite striking (Fig. 14). The crucial feature is that there
is a dramatic non-monotonicity in the density of active
links, in which the time scale for the crossover between a
nearly inactive state and an active steady state diverges
as q → qc = 2(z − 1) + 2
√
(z − 1)(z − 2). While this
strange behavior is the prediction from the mathematical
solution to the rate equations (39), the physical mecha-
nism that underlies this long-time non-monotonicity is
not understood.
VII. COMPROMISE MODELS
The bounded confidence, or compromise, model ac-
counts for the human attribute that individuals often
compromise their positions in an interaction. This class
of appealing models was introduced in the physics litera-
ture in Refs. [84, 85]. For simplicity, we take the opinion
of individual i as a real coordinate xi in a one-dimensional
opinion space. The state of the population is updated
as follows: Two agents are selected at random. If their
opinions are separated by a distance less than a threshold
that we take as fixed and equal to 1, they compromise;
conversely, if their opinions are separated by a distance
larger than 1, they do not interact (Fig. 15). This update
step is repeated until the opinions of all individuals reach
a static limit.
Suppose that each agent is initially assigned an opin-
ion x from the uniform distribution in [−∆,∆], with ∆
the only model parameter. According to the update rule
given above, the opinions of a randomly selected pair of
agents change according to (Fig. 15)
(x1, x2)→ 12 (x1 + x2, x1 + x2) |x2 − x1| < 1 ,
(x1, x2)→ (x1, x2) |x2 − x1| > 1 .
A natural way to determine the time evolution of the
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FIG. 15: Possible updates in the compromise model. Two
agents with opinions x1 and x2 with |x2−x1| < 1 compromise.
Otherwise there is no opinion change.
distribution of opinions, P (x, t), is to perform numer-
ical simulations of the process defined above. However,
such simulations become inefficient when agents opinions
are close. In this case, it becomes necessary to update
the opinions of agents many times for their opinions to
change by a small amount.
It is much more efficient to numerically integrate the
master equation that describes the time dependence of
P (x, t) because there is no “slowing down” of the dy-
namics. The master equation for the opinion distribution
is
∂
∂t
P (x, t) =
x
|x1−x2|<1
dx1dx2P (x1, t)P (x2, t)
× [δ ((x− 12 (x1+x2))− δ(x−x1)] . (40)
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FIG. 16: The final opinion distribution as a function of the
interaction threshold ∆. Vertical arrows mark the first 3 bi-
furcations at ∆1 = 1, ∆2 ≈ 1.871 and ∆3 ≈ 2.248.
While this equation does not appear to be soluble, it
can be integrated with high precision [86] in an efficient
way, and the strikingly beautiful final state bifurcation
diagram is shown in Fig. 16. For ∆ < ∆1 = 1, all pairs of
individuals are compatible and the final state is consensus
at x = 0. However, for ∆ > ∆1, a bifurcation arises in
which a small fraction of extremists—both positive and
negative—splits off from centrist consensus and forms a
positive and a negative extremist group. As ∆ increases
still further, the extremists become progressively more
extreme until a second bifurcation at ∆ = ∆2 ≈ 1.871,
where the centrist group splits into center-left and center-
right groups, with nobody left in the center. At ∆ =
∆3 ≈ 2.248, there is a third bifurcation where leftists
and rightists have moved sufficiently far from the center
that a new centrist group can nucleate.
As ∆ continues to increase, this sequence of bifurca-
tions systematically repeats. For fixed ∆, the spectrum
of opinion states qualitatively mirrors what has happened
in some multiparty parliamentary democracies. The im-
portant feature of the compromise model is that a too
narrow compromise range leads to a fragmented polity,
where each party lives within its own “echo chamber”
and has no interaction with other parties.
VIII. OUTLOOK
The venerable voter model has played a central role
in probability theory and in statistical physics because it
is one of the few exactly soluble many-particle interact-
ing systems. The voter model has also been a starting
point to describe a variety of social phenomena. How-
ever, the basic voter model is clearly too idealized to
be of direct empirical relevance and much research has
been devoted to incorporating socially motivated aspects
of decision making into the model. In the absence of a
correspondence between model parameters and empiri-
cal data, these generalizations should not be oversold as
descriptions of social reality, but rather, as potentially
useful descriptions of how opinions in a large population
can change over time.
In this short review, a number of these extensions of
the voter model were presented. These generalizations
by no means cover the range of work of this genre, but
we hope to have given the reader a useful perspective. In
spite of their obvious shortcomings, each of the models
presented here reveals rich phenomenology and appealing
methodological aspects.
A basic message from these modeling efforts is that in-
corporating any realistic feature of decision making typi-
cally leads to either a dramatically hindered approach to
consensus or to the prevention of consensus altogether.
This prevention of consensus addresses one of the glaring
unrealistic features of the voter model in that consensus
is always achieved. Models such as those outlined here
can also help to quantify verbal predictions that often ap-
pear in the social science literature and help determine
which types of models could reproduce empirical obser-
vations. Thus from the optimistic perspective, perhaps
some of these generalizations point the way to properly
calibrated models of social dynamics.
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